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I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondent has taken a different tact in this round of briefing, choosing to downplay the 
obvious problem with the Director not following the requirements of the statute concerning 
Regional Directors. The case law, legislative history, and meaning of the statute remain 
essentially unrefuted, that the Director did not have the power or authority to eliminate Regional 
Director positions, which elimination resulted in Arambarri's termination. 
Instead the Respondent now tries to assert that as Arambarri could have been properly 
terminated, the fact that the Director's actions did not follow the statute has no meaning and 
therefore Arambarri cannot complain. 
After review of the statute and the actual facts of what happened, this court should find 
for Arambarri and grant the relief requested. 
II. DIRECTOR ARMSTRONG'S ACTIONS IN 
ELIMINATING THE POSITION OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION 6 
WAS ILLEGAL. 
A. Idaho law requires seven separate Regional Directors located in each region, 
heading the Region. 
Respondent argues that part of the statute creating the Department of Health and Welfare 
gives the Regional Director complete autonomy to determine the number of Regional Directors 
and the role they serve, whether they are to be located in the region or not. That is far too broad 
a reading ofldaho Code §56-1002(3) and is contrary to the law, and the clear processes that led 
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to that law being created. 
Respondent ignores the substantial legislative history which emphasized the need for 
Regional Directors to be located in the region, accessible to the public, and to head the region. 
Idaho Code §56-1002(3) begins with a recitation of the purpose of the law, as contained 
in the legislative history submitted in Appellant's Brief. The first sentence reads "In order to 
provide more effective and economical access to the state of health and social services by the 
people of Idaho, the Governor is hereby authorized to establish substate administrative regions." 
In fact Governor Andrus, shortly after the law was created, established seven regions. Those 
regions are still in effect today. Governor Otter has not eliminated those regions or reduced 
them to three. 
The second sentence of that code section reads: "In the designation of these regions 
specific consideration shall be given to the geographic and economic convenience of those 
citizens included therein." 
Again, this language completely reflects the entire legislative history. 
The code then goes on to state: "Each substate administrative region shall be headed by a 
Regional Director." It would be a strange reading of that language to believe that the Director of 
Health and Welfare could appoint just one Regional Director, located in Boise, and claim that he 
headed each substate administrative region. However, that is the logical continuation of 
Respondents' argument, that the Director can eliminate regions, can combine regions, can have 
all the regions headed by one central Administrator. Such power is not contained in the statute. 
In fact is completely contrary to what the statutes means, requires and demands. 
Respondent defends the lower court who found "that there is no provision requiring a 
specific number of Regional Directors." That is a misreading of the statute. The statute requires 
the Governor to create the regions. He created seven of them. Those regions are still in 
existence. Certainly the Director of Health and Welfare cannot reverse the Governor's order. 
The law creating the Department of Health and Welfare proscribes a decentralized 
administrative structure. It is contained with regions established by the Governor, not regions 
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established by the Director. It requires the Regions to be administrative units, each headed by a 
Regional Director. This legislative language proscribing this organizational structure is unique 
in the Idaho Code. 
Certainly there are other state agencies where the Directors are given broader discretion 
in how they organize their administrative units. 
Idaho Code §39-104(2) which creates the Department of Environmental Quality reads 
"The department shall be organized in such administrative divisions or regions as may be 
necessary in order to efficiently administer the department." Idaho Code §20-503(3) reads: "The 
department of juvenile corrections shall be composed of such administrative units as may be 
established by the director for the proper and efficient administration of the powers and duties 
assigned to the director or the department." 
In this case, the legislature did not give the Department or the Director the authority to 
create those substate regions, or administrative units. This Court can only find that the 
legislature did not use that type of language in creating the Department of Health and Welfare as 
an intentional act on the part of the legislature, to limit the Director's authority. 
The Respondent argues that it is really irrelevant about heading the region, as it is up to 
the Director to determine what the Regional Directors do. Importantly, Respondent admits that 
there "may be a technical difference between those two concepts [heading a region and serving a 
region], that discussion does not have any bearing on the issue before the Court at this time." 
Respondent's Brief P. 25. 
In fact, that comment is part of the very issue before this Court. The law requires a 
Regional Director to head the region, and not serve the region. 
The argument about the difference between "heading" the region and "serving" the 
region is a real one. Again, the whole context of the statute requires Regional Administrators to 
"head" the region. Any other reading is completely contrary to the statute. Further there is 
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strong support for the role of Regional Administrators heading the region found in the extensive 
legislative history submitted. It simply cannot be ignored as the Director wishes. 
It is specifically this type of ambiguity or disagreement that has resulted in this suit. 
Arambarri contends, and the statute and the legislative history clearly support his contention, that 
the legislature limited the ability of the Director to centralize regional administration or to limit 
the ability of the Regional Directors to head their regions. Again, the Affidavit of Nick 
Arambarri is uncontested in this regard. R 104. 
Currently the new, centralized "Regional Directors" do not head any region. They do not 
supervise managers and staff, they do not make personnel decisions, they do not allocate 
resources, and on and on. The remaining "Regional Directors" have no authority in these 
administrative matters and thus do not head the region as envisioned by the statute and as 
explained by the legislative history. 
In fact this is acknowledged by Director Armstrong in the Minutes of the board where he 
explains that "maintaining the three will ensure some support at the local level". R 56 (emphasis 
added). 
This is completely contrary to the statute and the design of the law that created the 
department, as explained. The law does not require any Regional Directors to provide some 
support at the local level, the whole purpose of the law, as stated by the law, is to have a 
maximum level of authority at the local level. Regions no longer operate as administrative units. 
Staff working in the regions report to six different Division Administrators in Boise rather than 
all staff reporting to the Regional Director. 
Director Armstrong, on his own, has eliminated the role of Regional Directors heading 
the regions. Respondent asserts that the Director can ignore the statute or change its meaning, 
on his own. 
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B. Respondent did not terminate Nick Arambarri. 
Respondents arguments seem to coalesce into one, that as Nick Arambarri was a 
Regional Director as envisioned by Idaho Code §56-1002(3) and as he serves at the pleasure of 
the Director with the concurrence of the Board, no matter what Respondent did in eliminating 
Regional Director positions, if he followed the proper procedures Armstrong could terminate 
Nick. Respondent then goes through a lengthy argument of "so what, the end result is the same, 
Nick does not have a job." 
The facts indicate to the contrary. As Respondent points out in their brief, Nick 
Arambarri was informed of his termination on April 24, 2009. Respondent's Brief P. 1. 
Director Armstrong did not even present his decision to eliminate four Regional Director 
positions to the Board of Health and Welfare until a meeting on May 21, 2009, or almost a 
month following notifying Arambarri that his position was being eliminated. 
In the portion of the Board of Health and Welfare meeting of May 21, 2009, the Director 
gave his report. The Minutes state: "In an effort to reduce the personnel budget, the decision has 
been made to hub responsibilities of the Regional Directors. The positions will be cut to three, 
which will reduce the personnel by $500,000." R. 56. 
Nothing in the Minutes reflects the fact that the position of the Regional Director for 
Region 6 was eliminated. There is no indication as to which positions were eliminated, which 
individuals were retained and which were dismissed. It must be remembered that this report 
happened almost a month after the Director's representative told Nick that his position had been 
eliminated. 
The concurrence requirement of Idaho Code §56-1002(3) is intended to be a restriction 
on the Director's authority. It requires the Director to share the authority to appoint and 
terminate Regional Directors with board members, who represent the seven Department of 
Health and Welfare Regions. 
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It is important to note that other agency Directors have complete authority over 
appointments and terminations of at-will Administrators. Idaho Code §39-104(2), which 
addresses the creation of the Department of Environmental Quality reads: "Each division shall 
be headed by an administrator who shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the 
director." 
Likewise Idaho Code §20-503(3) which addresses the creation of the Department of 
Juvenile Corrections reads: "The Director shall appoint an administrator for each administrative 
unit within the department." Both of these agencies have Boards. 
The uniqueness of the concurrence requirement under Idaho Code §56-1002(3) shows 
that a different intention exists. The intention to have the board formally concur with the 
Director's decision to terminate an appointed Regional Director serving at the joint pleasure of 
the Director and the board certainly is not met by the actions of the department here. 
When presented with this obvious problem of a lack of concurrence, Respondent sought 
out Affidavits of Board members who said even though they were not asked to concur, as they 
did not object, you can presume their concurrence. This is after the fact speculation, is neither 
reliable nor legally relevant. 
The Affidavit of Stephen Weeg, who was also a Board member, stated: "At that meeting 
we were not asked to concur in the decision of the Director, no vote was taken. The board did 
not take any action or give any indication that we concurred in the decision of the Director. It 
was just reported to us as a fact that he had made the decision to eliminate four Regional 
Director positions. In the past when the Director has nominated someone to be a Regional 
Director, that came before the board and a formal vote was taken consenting with the 
appointment." R. 102. 
If all the Director wanted to do was terminate Nick's appointment as Regional Director, 
he could go before the board and recommend that, and ask their concurrence. At a minimum this 
would give the opportunity for discussion of that issue. The board may or may not have agreed. 
However, none of this ever happened. 
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Certainly Idaho Code Sections vary greatly in the authority of the Governor to appoint 
Directors of agencies, the authority of the Directors of those agencies to set up their agency or 
appoint board members and the like. For example, the Administrator of the Commission on 
Aging, Idaho Code §67-5004 is appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the 
Senate, but removable by the Governor at will. The same is true with the Administrator of the 
Division of Human Resources, Idaho Code §67-5308. Under Idaho Code §67-4221, which 
creates the Parks and Recreation board, the board is appointed by the Governor with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, then the board alone appoints the Director. 
It can only be recognized by the judiciary that the specific language creating the 
Department of Health and Welfare was understood by the legislature and they specifically 
intended to limit the authority of the Director of Health and Welfare concerning the creation of 
Regional Director positions and the appointment and service of Regional Directors. 
In fact nothing in the board Minutes indicates that Director Armstrong was requesting the 
board to concur in his decision to terminate Nick Arambarri's appointment as Director of Region 
6. To try and extrapolate that argument after the fact is a tacit recognition that Director 
Armstrong's actions, the way he went about eliminating the Regional Director positions, was 
contrary to the law. 
III. ARAMBARRl'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT 
Respondent argues that as Arambarri was properly terminated, as he served at the 
pleasure of the Director, the case is moot and Arambarri cannot win or recover any benefit from 
a decision. Again, this argument ignores the plain facts of the case. Arambarri has argued that 
Armstrong did not have the power or authority to eliminate the Regional Director position. If 
the Court agrees, Arambarri' s appointment as Regional Director will be reinstated and he will be 
awarded damages. Armstrong has never followed the procedures required under Idaho Code 
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§ 5 6-1002(3 ), to terminate Arambarri' s appointment. Nothing in the Minutes of the Board of 
Health and Welfare, indicate that Armstrong was seeking the concurrence of the Board in 
terminating the appointment of Nick Arambarri as Regional Director. The Affidavit of Stephen 
Weeg is unchallenged in that regard. R. 102. 
Certainly Nick does not feel the case is moot, he has not been reinstated, he has not 
received his pay, his benefits or other damages. 
This appeal seeks reinstatement, lost benefits, lost wages, and the like. That certainly is a 
request for relief that the Court can grant. 
IV. ARAMBARRI HAS STANDING TO BRING TIDS ACTION 
The Complaint filed by Arambarri in this matter alleges that he was the Regional 
Director of Region 6 until the Respondent unilaterally eliminated that position, resulting in his 
termination. R. 1 
The Complaint further alleges that this action by the Director of eliminating the Regional 
Director for Region 6 was illegal. R. 2. 
The Complaint also alleges that the Director violated the law by rescinding Arambarri's 
appointment as Region 6 Director position without the concurrence of the Board of Health and 
Welfare. R. 2. 
The Complaint alleges that Arambarri has been damaged in lost salary, lost benefits and 
the like. Furthermore the Complaint seeks a declaration that the actions of the Director in 
eliminating separate, local Regional Directors and eliminating the role of Regional Directors as 
head of the region is illegal and must be reversed. 
The prayer for relief by Arambarri seeks those declarations as well as reinstatement and 
damages for lost wages and benefits. 
Respondent argues that Arambarri's only role in this is as a concerned citizen and 
taxpayer and he has no personal stake in the outcome of this case. That argument ignores the 
obvious fact that Nick Arambarri's position was eliminated and he was terminated by the illegal 
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actions of the Director. 
The case cited by Respondent, Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 
(2002), outlines the requirements for standing. That suit involved Appellants who admitted that 
they were solely concerned citizens and taxpayers and had no personal stake in the event. The 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must "allege 
or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested 
will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. (citations omitted). This requires 
a showing of a "distinct palpable injury" and "Fairly traceable causal connection 
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Miles at 639, 788 P. 2d 
at 761 (internal quotations omitted). 
Arambarri's allegations concerning this termination of his job are obvious and admitted 
by Respondents. "In 2009 when Director Armstrong eliminated four of the seven Regional 
Director positions, Arambarri's appointment was rescinded and he lost his employment with 
IDHW." Respondents Brief, Pl. 
Arambarri was terminated as Regional Director effective June 16, 2009, and lost those 
wages and benefits since that time. That is obviously an injury in fact. The relief requested is 
that he be compensated for the consequences of the illegal action by the Director. 
It is hard to imagine a more direct impact. If Arambarri does not have standing to pursue 
a lawsuit challenging the illegal actions of the Director, which actions resulted in his losing his 
job, then no one could ever file suit. 
In the case of Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757, the Appellant survived 
a standing challenge when he alleged that the actions of Idaho Power Company and the Public 
Utilities Commission impacted him as a ratepayer. The District Court held that was not a 
particular grievance to himself, but shared alike with the public. The Idaho Supreme Court 
overturned that finding and pointed out that the central foundation of the Idaho Declaratory 
Judgment Act is the requirement of adverse parties. Id at 641, 778 P.2 at 764. The Idaho 
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Supreme Court found that Miles has alleged an injury that is not suffered by the general 
populace of the State of Idaho, was not a generalized grievance, but was a specialized and 
peculiar injury. Certainly Arambarri's allegations meet all the requirements of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. 
Respondent asserts that Arambarri could properly be discharged, pursuant to the statue, 
as he serves at the pleasure of the Director with the concurrence of the Board. Respondent then 
argues that if the Director had followed the proper procedures and simply terminated Arambarri, 
rather than eliminating the entire Regional Director position, the end result would be the same 
and Arambarri would be without a job. The Respondent then argues that as Arambarri is not 
entitled to damages for this termination, he cannot seek a declaration concerning the statute 
because he is a mere citizen and taxpayer. This argument is not correct on either ground, nor is 
the assumption correct that as Arambarri will lose this appeal, then he cannot bring this appeal. 
This ignores the facts of the case. The Director did not terminate Arambarri's 
appointment, he eliminated the Regional Director positions, then later he reported this action to 
the Board. There was no request to the board for concurrence of Director Armstrong's decision 
to rescind Arambarri's appointment. That was never even brought up with the Board. Four 
Appointments were rescinded and three were maintained, all at the discretion of the Director, 
without the concurrence of the Board. What Arambarri is challenging is that the Director did not 
have the power or authority to do what he did, and he did not have the power or authority to 
harm Arambarri as he has done. Arambarri's lost salary is not an indirect injury suffered by 
everyone in the State of Idaho. It is very real to him. 
The issue before the District Court below as framed by the District Court after 
questioning at oral argument was: 
The parties are further in agreement that resolution of this matter can be found 
through determination of the following, single issue: Whether the Respondent, as 
the Director of the Idaho Department of Health and welfare, had the statutory 
authority to abolish the regional director positions. R. 166. 
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It is difficult to believe that Respondent honestly thinks that "Arambarri is not in a 
position to seek relief since he has not alleged, nor demonstrated that he is in a class of 
individuals harmed by Director Armstrong's actions." Respondent's Brief at 12. 
In fact Arambarri has alleged he was personally harmed by the Director's illegal actions. 
Curiously on Page IO of Respondent's Brief, Armstrong argues that there can be no liability 
"because there is no allegation that the termination of Arambarri violated any public policy." 
That is not true. There can be no more direct expression of public policy than the language of a 
statute which establishes that public policy. Arambarri has alleged that Armstrong violated the 
statue and therefore violated the public policy expressed by that statute. Certainly the legislature 
can define public policy by a statute. 
The public policy of the state is found in the Constitution and statues. Edmonson v. 
Schearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3 733 (2003); Boise-Payette Lumber Company 
v. Challis Independent School District No. 1, 46 Idaho 403,268 P. 26 (1928). 
It is hard to imagine a more direct violation of public policy than the actions of the 
Director, who intentionally decided he would ignore the statute and act contrary to its specific 
requirements. 
Arambarri's allegation and prayer for declaratory judgment also gives him standing to 
bring this action. 
Idaho Code § I 0-1202 states: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other wntmgs 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or under legal relations thereunder. 
Obviously Arambarri is a person interested in a statute and the interpretation of that 
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statute by the Respondents. This is more than just a generic allegation of being a taxpayer and a 
citizen. Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 37562 (IDSCCI slip opinion, 2001 
No. 60, May 26, 2011), Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 960 P.2 181 (1998), Brewster v. City 
of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502,678 P.2 765 (1988). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Nick Arambarri had been an employee of the Department of Health and Welfare since 
that department was created in 1974. A review of how and why that department was created can 
leave no misunderstanding concerning the requirements of the Idaho Code, that decentralized, 
localized administration is what the legislature demanded and what Governor Andrus created. 
Without changing that law or even seeking authority from the legislature to modify it, the 
Director of the Department of Health and Welfare decided, on his own, to ignore the law. He 
hoped no one would contest him. 
DATED this ~of July, 2011. 
Do 
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